CD/PV.650
25 May 1993

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 25 May 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Hou Zhitong (China)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 650th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. At the outset I wish to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference and myself to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, His Excellency Johann Jørgen Holst, who is addressing the Conference today. The Minister assumed his functions as recently as 2 April 1993, and I am sure that members appreciate the interest he has shown in speaking to the Conference at such an early stage of his tenure. Before being appointed to his present function, His Excellency Johann Jørgen Holst was twice Minister of Defence and prior to that served first as Secretary of State in the Ministry of Defence and later in the same capacity in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was a member of the advisory council on arms control and disarmament of the Norwegian Government from 1969 until the end of the Government. He has also wide academic experience and has published a number of works on security and foreign policy. I am convinced that all of us will listen with particular interest to his statement today.

I am pleased to note the presence among us today of the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, whom I welcome cordially at this plenary meeting.

Before we proceed with the list of speakers allow me to make an opening statement on the occasion of the Chinese presidency of the Conference.

I am greatly honoured to be assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament on behalf of China. I promise the Conference that in fulfilling the duties of the President, I and my delegation will do our best to cooperate with all of you. I shall also rely on the knowledge, experience and help of all the colleagues in jointly tackling the important issues before this Conference.

First of all, I wish to express on behalf of the Conference and myself our gratitude to my predecessor, Mr. Gerald Shannon, the distinguished Ambassador of Canada, and our appreciation of his able guidance under which the Conference on Disarmament has registered further progress. He has provided me with fresh experience. I would also like to join my predecessor in welcoming warmly in our midst the new representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Dobrev. I am also very happy to have the opportunity to have close cooperation with the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and personal representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, whose remarkable diplomatic skill and whose capable team are undoubtedly an indispensable guarantee for the smooth work of the CD.

Distinguished delegates, I am pleased to inform you that on my assumption of the presidency I have just received a message to the Conference on Disarmament from Mr. Qian Qichen, Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister of the Chinese Government. I shall now read out his message:

"On the opening of the second part of the 1993 annual session of the Conference on Disarmament and on China's assumption of the presidency

(The President)

of the Conference, I wish on behalf of the Chinese Government to extend our warm congratulations and cordial greetings to all these distinguished representatives.

"The world today is at an historic juncture of momentous change. With the disintegration of the bipolar structure and the end of the cold war and the confrontation between the two military blocs, the world is moving towards multipolarity. Against such a backdrop the world situation remains complex and fluid as various contradictions and disputes grow, some even escalating into armed conflict and regional wars. There are still threats to international peace and security. Disarmament is as important as ever.

"As the sole multilateral negotiating body, the Conference has made unremitting efforts for and a positive contribution to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international peace and security, as evidenced by the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Today the Conference is faced with new opportunities and challenges and carries the high hopes of the international community. It is, therefore, necessary to strengthen the Conference further and address the urgent issues confronting it, including the expansion of its membership, so as to tap the tremendous potential and give full play to the important goals of the CD.

"The Chinese Government pursues unswervingly an independent foreign policy of peace whose fundamental objective is the maintenance of international peace and the promotion of economic development. China has always opposed the arms race and supported the early attainment of the goals of disarmament set forth in relevant resolutions and documents. China has taken a series of major steps on her own initiative and contributed her due. In the prevention of nuclear war and the provision of security assurances, for example, the Chinese Government early took the lead in unilaterally undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances, and unconditionally guaranteeing not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. Meanwhile, China has also proposed the conclusion of an international convention to this effect which, China believes, will be a major contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

"The Chinese Government takes a positive view of, and attaches great importance to, the goals of the Conference, and has all along participated in this work actively and constructively. In future, China will continue to work with other participating States of the Conference in an effort to strengthen further the role of the Conference and to make a new contribution

to the maintenance of peace and the promotion of development. May the Conference on Disarmament achieve new success."

(The President)

Distinguished delegates, just as some of my predecessors have said, the President of this Conference should realize that he is duty-bound to function in an unbiased and balanced way. In the meantime, this does not prevent him from expressing the positions of his own Government. You can be assured that I will follow this practice, strictly observing the rules of procedure of the Conference.

May I point out with pleasure and appreciation that, thanks to the effective leadership of distinguished Ambassador Amorim of Brazil and Mr. Deyanov of Bulgaria, the CD made considerable headway during its first session, thus laying a sound foundation for the whole year. The Conference reached an understanding on its 1993 agenda and agreed, without prejudice to any further decisions on the organizational framework of other items, to begin work immediately on four items: ad hoc committees were established on these items and substantive work began quite soon. In addition, the Conference adopted two reports: the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", and a report on the ongoing review of the agenda, composition and methods of work of the Conference.

I am also gratified to note that the Conference has appointed distinguished Ambassador Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico and Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia as special coordinators for the issues of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, the agenda and the membership of the Conference. These are questions of importance. So far more than 30 States have formally applied for CD membership. This not only reflects the great attention and expectation the international community places on the CD but also shows it is urgent to seek a solution to the enlargement of the CD membership. Furthermore Ambassador Marín Bosch also presides over the consultations on the non-proliferation issue. I am sure that with their diplomatic experience and their dedication to their work the distinguished Ambassadors will make further contributions to the smooth settlement of these questions.

"Nuclear test ban" is one of the important items on the agenda of the Conference and has the attention of many delegations. Fully understanding the urgent demand of all the non-nuclear-weapon States for a nuclear test ban, China has also adopted a very prudent attitude of self-restraint towards nuclear tests and sincerely hopes to see the issue solved within the framework of complete nuclear disarmament. We are pleased to note that this year the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban was established at an early date and that it has begun its work quite expeditiously under the leadership of its distinguished chairman,

Ambassador Tanaka of Japan. China will as in the past take part in the Ad Hoc Committee in a constructive spirit, and wishes it progress in its work.

"Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" is another important agenda item of the Conference. Although the CD has given this issue many years' consideration, no satisfactory results have been achieved so far.

(The President)

With the guidance of distinguished Ambassador Neagu of Romania, we believe the NSA ad hoc committee will make progress in this work. Non-nuclear-weapon States far and wide, whilst striving for and contributing to the promotion of nuclear disarmament and the maintenance of world peace, request that the nuclear-weapon States offer them security assurances. China considers this very reasonable, and we give our full support and unilateral assurances. The principled position and positive attitude of the Chinese Government on this issue are shown in the message from Mr. Qian, Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister of China.

The CD this year for the first time set up an ad hoc committee on the issue of transparency in armaments which is chaired by His Excellency, Mr. Zahran, Ambassador of Egypt; we appreciate the efforts made by the Chairman and wish him success. China joined the consensus on the relevant resolution of the General Assembly and actively participates in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. Appropriate and practicable TIA measures would be conducive to international confidence-building, the relaxation of tension and establishment of reasonable levels of armaments for all States. The purpose of practising TIA should be to enhance peace, security and stability of all countries, regions and the world. China has put forward its positions on this issue in a working paper. We wish to work with other delegations to produce results acceptable to all.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has already begun its work under the guidance of distinguished Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany. China holds the view that it is of certain positive significance for the Ad Hoc Committee to discuss confidence-building measures; at the same time, it is important genuinely to realize the objectives of preventing an arms race in outer space prohibiting all kinds of space weapons, realizing the non-weaponization of outer space and banning the use of force and acts of hostility in outer space etc. We hope that progress can be made in all these respects, and that an international agreement acceptable to all can be reached which, undoubtedly, will be universally welcomed.

Given the new situation in the world, the international community is confronted with ever more urgent tasks for furthering the progress of disarmament and strengthening international peace and security. Our Conference on Disarmament is also facing new challenges and opportunities. The conclusion of the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention shows once again the great potential and vitality of the CD. Let us continue our cooperation further so as

to enable this sole international multilateral disarmament negotiating body to play a greater role and make even more contributions. I thank you all. That concludes my opening statement.

I now invite the speakers for this plenary meeting to make statements. On the list after the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway are the representatives of Indonesia, Senegal and Canada.

I now give the floor to Mr. Johann Jørgen Holst, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway.

Mr. HOLST (Norway): Mr. President, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, may I first of all congratulate you, Ambassador Hou Zhitong, on your assumption of the important function as President of the Conference on Disarmament. In this period of dramatic global political change, it will indeed take courage and wisdom to steer the Conference in such a way that it can continue to serve the aspirations of the world community, and it is indeed an honour and a privilege to be able to address you here today. You are all engaged in one of the essential tasks of our time. My country supports this task and seeks close association therewith.

My point of departure is that the end of the cold war does not obviate the need for arms control and disarmament, regionally or globally. On the contrary, it is my contention that the need and opportunities will grow. It is also my contention that the agenda of arms control ought to change as the overriding East-West division has given way to a more complex and differentiated set of security problems and challenges.

We no longer confront the need to stabilize a relation of nuclear confrontation, to remove, as it were, incentives for early action and temptations to capitalize on perceived advantages of striking first as well as sources of potential accidents. Stability has become a more complex and variegated objective as it has to be pursued in a variety of specific regional contexts. Nevertheless, the end of the cold war will also enhance the prospects and increase the needs for global instruments and regulations. General rules, norms and standards increasingly must replace the regulatory functions and implications of the former East-West system of mutual deterrence.

Future basic aims and purposes of arms control and disarmament in our view remain: (1) to reduce the chance of war; (2) to reduce destruction in the event of war; (3) to facilitate the early termination of war; (4) to build international security through cooperative rather than competitive undertakings; and (5) simply to save money.

To complicate matters, the end of the cold war has added five major new challenges: firstly, to combat and prevent environmental pollution,

particularly nuclear pollution, as a result of former military activity and as a direct consequence of comprehensive disarmament. It should be noted in this connection that implementation of disarmament agreements could be very expensive indeed. It will also require international assistance and cooperation. Thus those agreements act also as stimulus to the growth of an ethos of common security; secondly, to dismantle the mental and physical remnants of a former confrontation; third, to prevent social dislocations which may threaten democratic stability as a result of large-scale build-down of military establishments; fourth, to foster mechanisms and procedures for war prevention, crisis management, peace-keeping and peace enforcement, and fifth, to facilitate and promote peaceful change through community-building in order to contain and constrain the growth of ethnic nationalism.

(Mr. Holst, Norway)

A renewed effort should now be devoted to implementing a global agenda of arms control for the post-cold-war era. We need to fix and operationalize new rules, norms and standards which could stimulate the growth of a sustainable international security order. What are the basic norms which should sustain that order? I think there are five: first, commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes; second, commitment to the norm of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; third, commitment to a system of effective control designed to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missiles; fourth, commitment to instituting equitable and cooperative systems for managing the transfer of sensitive technologies; and fifth, guidelines in regard to the transfer of conventional weapons in order to prevent local arms races, instability and aggression.

The Conference on Disarmament is the principal custodian of the aspirations and interests of the world community in the field of disarmament. In order to assess achievements and future directions, we should remind ourselves of the original order of priority in regard to global disarmament negotiations. Do you remember it? Nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons; and the reduction of armed forces. Now, the priorities were established against the background of the cold-war arms build-up, particularly on nuclear weapons. The priorities remain, but the nature of the challenges and the potential solutions have changed.

In taking stock of achievements in disarmament and arms control since 1978, we should derive encouragement from recent developments:

> The nuclear threat has receded dramatically. When implemented, the START I and II agreements will reduce drastically the levels of strategic nuclear arms. Through preferential reduction and elimination of destabilizing systems, they will institute a system of substantially lowered threats, and where nuclear weapons constitute weapons of last resort. The

INF Treaty led to the destruction of a whole class of nuclear weapons. Other categories of nuclear weapons in Europe, such as short-range nuclear ground-based missiles, nuclear artillery munitions, nuclear air defence and demolition systems, have been removed unilaterally. All nuclear weapons have been removed from naval vessels, except dedicated strategic submarines, during normal peacetime operations;

The Chemical Weapons Convention should enter into force at the earliest possible stage. Norway intends to conclude the ratification process before the summer recess of our Parliament. As we move closer to the entry into force of the Convention, the problems related to its implementation are becoming more manifest. We note with concern the political and economic difficulties faced by key signatory States in this regard. Broad international efforts are needed to implement the provisions of the Convention. Norway is ready to play her part in such a joint effort. Most particularly, we are prepared to assist in the timely and safe destruction of chemical weapons in areas in the vicinity of our

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own territory. The Chemical Weapons Convention, which constitutes a tremendous triumph for the negotiating effort, skill and perseverance of the Conference on Disarmament, promises to eliminate a whole category of weapons of mass destruction;

In the area of conventional armaments, the CFE Treaty promises to bring down the levels of conventional armaments in the European region, and to stabilize the situation in former forward areas through the preferential reduction and withdrawal of heavy weapons needed for surprise attack. In addition to the direct effects of the Treaty, the end of the cold war and the political transformation of Europe have led to a general reduction of military expenditures and armaments in the northern hemisphere;

A comprehensive system of confidence- and security-building measures has been put in place and into operation in Europe. It contributes to transparency, predictability and crisis management. The CSCE process constitutes an example which, properly adopted, could enhance security and cooperation also in other regions.

These are, it seems to me, substantial achievements. However, as I have already noted, implementation of the agreements will take time, require extensive cooperation, pose new challenges, and could introduce new sources of conflict and instability if they are not carefully monitored and managed.

The two START treaties must be implemented with vigour and without delay. Ratification and implementation of the treaties are essential in order to maintain the integrity of the START process and of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as cornerstones of international security. Norway calls on Ukraine to ratify

START I and to allow for its provisions to be fully implemented and for START II to be ratified and implemented. We urge Ukraine and Kazakhstan to accede without delay and prior conditions to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States in accordance with the Lisbon Protocol.

The end of the cold war has paved the way for a new international consensus on major security issues. The Conference on Disarmament will have a vital role to play in that noble and important endeavour by building on recent achievements and developing a new agenda for the post-cold-war era.

I have already indicated what I think will be some of the key challenges. Let me just reiterate some principal perspectives:

Our future security agenda is more complex than ever before. The need for a global approach has assumed a new urgency. The prospects of success have also been enhanced by a new and growing global consensus;

Future security depends on a mix of regional and global initiatives and measures. This Conference remains the main custodian of the global part of that equation;

(Mr. Holst, Norway)

Arms control and disarmament will continue to play a significant role in our quest for greater security and stability. In an interdependent world it is compellingly needed for global institutions to play a growing role. We need to stimulate a major return to multilateralism also in the field of disarmament in order to enhance minimum world order and reasonable governance.

We believe that the Conference on Disarmament has benefited from the participation of active observers, and that an expansion of the CD would not make the Conference less efficient as a negotiating body. On the contrary, bringing in new members would at this juncture mark the beginning of a new chapter in the work of the Conference as it embarks on the task of constructing the infrastructure of an equitable and robust new international security order. A certain expansion would lend both legitimacy and credibility to that new dedication.

In our view, an expansion of the Conference on Disarmament should not be postponed further. Norway applied for membership in 1982, and has been the endorsed Western candidate since 1984. I can confirm that Norway maintains her interest in membership and stands ready to provide the necessary back-up in terms of resources which full membership would entail.

Since 1981 Norway has been an observer to the Conference on Disarmament and participated in all its subsidiary bodies. Norwegian spokesmen have contributed on a regular basis to the general debate, thereby underlining the political

significance which we attach to the work of this Conference. We have attempted also to contribute our views in other ways, such as through working documents.

In connection with Norway's participation in the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1981 initiated a research programme on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. As a result of this programme, working documents have been introduced in the Conference on Disarmament on an annual basis.

Norway has hosted a number of international seminars and conferences on disarmament matters, including a symposium on the Chemical Weapons Convention for representatives of CD delegations in Oslo in May 1987. An international seminar on non-proliferation of chemical and biological weapons will be held in Oslo in December 1993.

In the area of seismic verification, over the years Norway has devoted considerable resources to seismological research relevant to a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The operation of the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) and the associated research activities form key elements in these efforts. Norway has introduced several working documents reflecting the main results from this programme.

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Our national expertise in the field of seismological verification of a test-ban treaty has been built up around the NORSAR facilities. The research at NORSAR has focused on the development of techniques for detecting, locating and identifying small seismic events, using very sensitive high-frequency arrays. The important role of arrays in a global network has been demonstrated. There is consensus in the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) that such arrays should form a backbone of any future monitoring system.

We note with satisfaction that the GSE is preparing to conduct global tests of a revised system of a comprehensive test-ban treaty monitoring within two years (GSETT 3). Through NORSAR Norway is prepared to take an active part in this work. This summer we will celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the agreement between the United States of America and Norway establishing NORSAR. The Norwegian Government is proud indeed of the valuable work performed by NORSAR during this quarter of a century.

For Norway, a comprehensive nuclear test ban remains an objective of the highest priority. The unilateral moratoria on testing now in force for a majority of the nuclear-weapon States are most welcome. They also provide a historic opportunity which we must not fail to seize. We are indeed heartened by the Clinton-Yeltsin declaration from Vancouver in which the two presidents agreed to commence negotiations on a comprehensive multilateral nuclear test ban at an

early date. We also support the French proposal for consultations among the five nuclear-weapon States on the nuclear-test-ban issue.

The nuclear-weapon States carry the main responsibility for concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Negotiations should commence at an early date and proceed in parallel with the preparations for the NPT Review Conference. Such parallelism would greatly facilitate the preparatory work and contribute to a successful outcome of the 1995 conference. Indeed, I am genuinely worried that failure to produce such parallelism and to negotiate with urgency and in good faith for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty could put the whole NPT Conference in serious jeopardy.

Let me list very briefly the reasons why we attach such great symbolic and substantive importance to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty:

(1) It symbolizes the end of the nuclear arms race which shaped and distorted international relations during the period of the cold war. Nuclear weapons of course, do not lend themselves to disinvention but they may be reduced, dismantled and destroyed, and their further development stopped;

(2) It projects a much reduced role for nuclear weapons in national and international security strategies, thus reducing incentives for proliferation;

(3) It constitutes a necessary and reasonable quid pro quo of the nuclear-weapon States for general commitment to a viable and equitable non-proliferation regime;

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(4) It provides a concrete basis for cooperative undertakings among the nuclear-weapon States, thereby deepening and broadening the emerging great-Power consensus;

And finally, (5) it provides additional insurance against nuclear pollution of the environment. We have numerous examples of venting of radioactive debris following underground tests. My country is particularly concerned on this score, since the only remaining Russian nuclear test site is at Novaya Zemlya, very close to Norwegian territory and in an ocean area with a fragile ecology of enormous importance for the harvesting of major fish stocks.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban is possible. The problem of verification can be solved. The basis for a comprehensive-test-ban-treaty verification system presumably would be a global monitoring network of sensitive seismic stations. Such a system should make use of the most recent technological advances and also incorporate high-quality stations of the array type. On-site challenge inspection, use of satellite imagery, measurement of airborne radionuclides and

other supplementary verification measures can also be envisaged. Problems of verification no longer constitute legitimate obstacles.

Over the years many reasons have been put forward in favour of continued nuclear testing. The alleged need to ensure confidence in the nuclear stockpile and to improve the safety and security of nuclear weapons are now the main arguments against the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Reduced numbers of warheads contribute to enhanced overall safety and control. Older weapons should be destroyed first, leaving the safest and most secure warheads in the stockpiles. Elimination of the need for high-readiness responses allows nuclear weapons to be stored and secured in the safest way. Weapons may be retrofitted with advanced permissive action links, etc. Warheads may be re-manufactured to original specifications if problems arise or according to agreed schedules. There is now fairly broad agreement among experts that the relevant problems can be solved by programmes of stockpile inspection and non-nuclear tests.

In the past, the principal argument for nuclear testing was the development of new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons. This argument is no longer compelling. The perceived necessity of developing new warheads was often justified by the objective of strengthening deterrence and preventing unilateral advantages from accruing to the adversary in the nuclear arms race. Such perspectives no long animate or should be permitted to animate policy-making and outlooks in the post-cold-war era.

The outcome of the next NPT Review Conference in 1995 is of utmost importance. I am happy to note that the preparatory process initiated in New York earlier this month is off to a good start. Norway will continue to work for universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance with its provisions. The Treaty should be further strengthened and remain in force indefinitely. The NPT is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to

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prevent proliferation. It has to form the centre-piece in a broad cooperative regime of nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States designed to prevent nuclear proliferation, strengthen the non-proliferation effort and incentives, and institute a credible and effective system of sanctions and rewards.

Norway deeply regrets the announced intention by North Korea to withdraw from the NPT. Such a step would constitute a threat to regional as well as to international stability. We have urged the Government in that country bilaterally and in the United Nations to change its decision. We therefore welcome United Nations Security Council resolution 825 concerning North Korea's intention to withdraw from the NPT. This resolution demonstrates that the international community is dedicated to making every effort to convince North Korea to reaffirm its commitment to the NPT and to comply fully with the safeguard obligations it has entered into with the IAEA. Treaties must be observed and adhered to.

May I, in conclusion, return to the issue of nuclear testing. Continued nuclear tests provide a particular focus on radiation risks. Public opinion in northern Europe, and in my country in particular, is increasingly concerned about the danger of radiation from nuclear waste in adjacent waters or on land, from nuclear accidents, or from accidental venting from nuclear tests. There is also the danger that nuclear tests could destabilize nuclear waste that has been dumped in areas surrounding the test site.

Ours are times of both opportunity and danger. Let us therefore, seize the opportunity to combat and reduce the dangers produced by arms. The Conference on Disarmament provides the instrument to make possible that which is necessary.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway for his important statement and for the kind remarks he addressed to me.

I now invite Ambassador Brotodiningrat of Indonesia to make a statement.

Mr. BROTODININGRAT (Indonesia): Mr. President, on behalf of the Indonesian delegation, please allow me, at the outset, to congratulate you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Knowing your personal qualities, I am fully confident that at this second session the Conference will further advance its work on the items identified during the first session, namely: the nuclear test ban, prevention of the arms race in outer space, negative security assurances and transparency in armaments. I would also like to sincerely thank Ambassador Amorim of Brazil, Mr. Deyanov of Bulgaria and Ambassador Shannon of Canada for the most efficient and exemplary manner with which they successively presided over our previous meetings. May I seize this occasion to join you in paying tribute to the Foreign Minister of Norway, H.E. Mr. Johann Jørgen Holst, whose address will certainly be a great source of inspiration to the Conference in its current and future deliberations. Finally, I wish also to avail myself of this opportunity to welcome our new colleague, Ambassador Dobrev of Bulgaria.

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

In my intervention today I would like to confine myself to a few points in the light of recent developments, in particular those related to the strengthening and extension of the regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard being a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Indonesia has always been and will continue to be committed to the letter and spirit of the Treaty and always stands ready to join any efforts in promoting the full implementation of the Treaty. Therefore my delegation fully shares the view expressed by a number of colleagues who have spoken during the last plenary sessions of the Conference on Disarmament, asserting that the Non-Proliferation Treaty - with 157 States adhering to it - is so far the most widely-supported arms-control treaty in existence. The successful implementation of this treaty in the midst of the adverse situation created by some of the worst moments in the

world's recent history, whereby nuclear war was often seen as an imminent possibility, represents in my view another testimony to the remarkable accomplishment of the Treaty.

Without belittling those successes, it would nevertheless be less than candid on our part not to point out that the long-overdue fulfilment of obligations under the Treaty by a number of States parties have always raised considerable concerns amongst the majority of States parties advocating the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Treaty ever since it came into force. Such unfulfilled obligations as those relating to article VI and preambular paragraphs 9 and 11 on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, as well as the unsatisfactory implementation of article IV on the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, have become the bone of contention between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, thus eroding the authority of the Treaty.

Being a non-nuclear-weapon State which has fully and faithfully observed all obligations under the Treaty, Indonesia is consistently opposed to any action leading toward the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Inasmuch as we respect the relevant international authority, we also expect other States parties to do exactly the same. However, the most recent event in this regard has also taught us a useful lesson as to how the shortcomings and inconsistencies in the implementation of the Treaty have made a clear-cut issue of compliance exceedingly complicated to address. Another important lesson that could be drawn from our own national and sub-regional perspective is the added relevance of our idea on the nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia, in keeping with article VII of the NPT.

After two decades, and with the fundamental changes in the international political scene culminating in the collapse of super-Power rivalry and bloc politics, the world looks totally different today from what it was in 1970, when the NPT came into force. The new realities and challenges generated by these political re-alignments have to be accommodated and further regenerated as a momentum for urgently overcoming the weaknesses in the implementation of the Treaty and thus strengthening the credibility of the NPT as a trustworthy non-proliferation regime to which we all aspire. In this regard, it is our considered opinion that the credibility of the NPT can be judged mainly from whether the letter and spirit of the provisions which are fundamental to the

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prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, as enshrined in articles I, II, IV, VI and VII, have been fully respected by all States parties.

It is indeed a source of satisfaction for us to see that, through the implementation of the obligations as stipulated in articles I and II of the NPT,

to date we are capable of restricting the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the States parties and formally limiting the nuclear-weapon States to five only. In this respect, we are very much encouraged by the recent decisions taken by France and China to join the NPT. With all five formal nuclear-weapon States on board, my delegation sincerely hopes that articles I and II can be fully implemented, thereby effectively preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, we continue to be disturbed by a series of reports concerning nuclear-weapon States who, instead of devoting themselves to the promotion to the full extent of the exchange of equipment, materials as well as scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and of cooperation among States parties, were busily engaged in helping non-State parties to develop their nuclear programmes, which could lead to nuclear-weapons capabilities. In so doing they are certainly failing to live up to their commitments as subscribed under articles I and IV of the NPT. Furthermore, we continue to note with deep concern the inconsistencies in the measures taken against real and potential violators. This double-standard approach has long been criticized and has generated resentment among the non-States parties who fully abide by their obligations under the Treaty. It is high time for us to redress such unjust practices.

My delegation has on many occasions expressed its satisfaction at seeing the most powerful nuclear-weapon States, namely the United States of America and the Russian Federation, engaged in serious negotiations to reduce their nuclear weapons arsenals and succeed in concluding such important treaties as START I and, more recently, START II. While affirming that the conclusion of these two treaties will certainly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in this post-cold-war era, my delegation sincerely hopes that their implementation will take place in line with the spirit of article VI of the NPT. We would like to stress this point because, according to our rough calculation, even after the second phase of START II has been completed in the year 2003, the two parties will still possess nuclear arsenals which are quantitatively bigger and qualitatively better than they possessed in 1970, when the NPT entered into force.

Finally, considering the fact that the fundamental objectives of the NPT have yet to be achieved, we find it imperative that in the preparations for the 1995 NPT conference we begin to launch vigorous efforts to improve the implementation of the Treaty in order to ensure its effectiveness, and hence its future beyond 1995. In this context, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, including my own, have on many occasions urged all nuclear-weapon States to honour their commitments under the Treaty in good faith in order to achieve, inter alia, nuclear disarmament at the earliest

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possible date. As a starting point, my delegation wishes to suggest converting the temporary moratorium on nuclear testing, which the majority of the nuclear-

weapon States have so far observed, into a permanent one. Hopefully before the 1995 NPT conference, we shall already be able to gradually develop it into a legally binding agreement in the form of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). My delegation believes that the establishment of a CTBT before the 1995 NPT conference will help ensure the future of the Treaty beyond 1995.

Before concluding, please allow me to say a few words on the forthcoming 1995 NPT conference. While being aware that article X, paragraph 2, of the NPT speaks only of deciding whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods, nevertheless, I venture, by virtue of article VIII, paragraph 3, to suggest that, before taking any decision on the extension of the Treaty, we would do better to seize the opportunity provided by the Conference in order to seriously examine the extent to which the fundamental objectives of the NPT - namely the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament - have been effectively achieved. Only on the basis of the results of such an overall review shall we be able to clearly determine whether the NPT merits to be extended indefinitely or for an additional fixed period or periods.

In conclusion, without in any way advocating duplication of the exercise already conducted elsewhere, my delegation wishes to underline the importance of the understanding reached at the beginning of the 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament to the effect that informal consultations on non-proliferation issues be conducted under the aegis of the Conference on Disarmament, which, hopefully, will facilitate the work done more formally within the framework of the preparatory process for the 1995 Review Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and his kind words to the Chair.

I now invite Ambassador Sene, the representative of Senegal to make a statement.

Mr. SENE (Senegal) (translated from French): Mr. President, on this symbolic day, that of the thirtieth anniversary of the Organization for African Unity, allow me first of all to say how pleased we are at seeing the delegation of China, a country which has great weight in world affairs, accede to the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation would like to convey to you its heartfelt congratulations upon your election to this high office and assure you of its full support in the search for solutions to the urgent problems of disarmament. I am convinced that, in the crucial transitional period through which the Conference is going, your skill and experience will prove valuable aids in the discharge of your mandate.

I should also like to express my gratitude to your predecessor the Ambassador of Canada, Mr. Gerald Shannon, whose enlightened leadership greatly facilitated our work. I should also like to address my warmest wishes to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui, who is, as it were, the memory and spirit of this body.

I should also like to pay tribute here to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mr. Johann Jørgen Holst, for his country's eminent contribution to disarmament efforts and for a brilliant statement that was eloquent illustration of Norway's praiseworthy choice.

Lastly, I would like to thank my friend, Ambassador Soemadi Brotodiningrat of Indonesia, for his altogether remarkable analysis of how the Non-Proliferation Treaty could be better implemented.

In the post-cold-war era significant advances have been achieved in the areas of arms control and disarmament. In this respect it is noteworthy that numerous bilateral, regional and international agreements have been concluded and measures have been taken to strengthen international security. In this context, suffice it to mention the unprecedented success of the international community's efforts to negotiate the Convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons which almost 140 States signed in Paris in January 1993. My country has also followed with interest the progress in regarding the reduction of nuclear weapons made in recent years between the United States and the Russian Federation.

Disarmament agreements, it is true, always take quite a long time to put into effect because of their complexity and the financial and technological resources they entail. In the case of the START II treaty, for example complete implementation is scheduled for the year 2003, and the Chemical Weapons Convention provides for a period of ten years for the destruction of existing arsenals, although it does, fortunately, have provisions to prevent proliferation during the period of transition towards a world free of chemical weapons. But what of the Earth, of the men, women and children who inhabit the planet and who can no longer bear the burden of the production and then the destruction of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons, the procedures for which entail considerable investment if the weapons are to be eliminated without harming the environment. And, on the subject of nuclear weapons, it would be more reassuring to exchange data on quantities of fissionable material released during destruction of armaments in the context of the reduction of nuclear arsenals and information concerning their places of storage. Clearly, while we need to be realistic and pragmatic, the emphasis must, in the final analysis, be on the necessity of negotiations on a convention providing, like that on chemical weapons, for the prohibition of all production, and the destruction of existing stocks of nuclear weapons.

I would like to go back to an event which was referred to here by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. Miguel Marín Bosch, and remind you that during the forty-sixth World Health Assembly there was abundant and lengthy

discussion of the effects of a nuclear war on health and the environment. The aim was to decide whether use of such a weapon by a

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State was not a violation of international law, including a violation of the WHO Constitution. The resolution that was adopted calls for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on this matter. The problem is certainly important, even in a post-cold-war period, and everyone agrees with the conclusions reached by the scientific experts who submitted an unequivocal report to WHO on the effects of a nuclear war on human health, on the air, on water, on soil, in short, on the entire economic and production fabric, not to mention the consequences of a "nuclear winter". It is true, too, that an advisory opinion, even though not binding, always carries moral and political weight. Nevertheless, the fundamental question, in our view, is how can we prevent a nuclear war, or how can we achieve general disarmament as in the case of chemical weapons. It is in that direction that we should direct our energies, but these questions must be discussed in the Conference on Disarmament and not in WHO. We must bear in mind this need for consensus and this wisdom at the next World Health Assembly in order to avoid confrontation and the succession of secret ballots which took so much time. It would help us avoid misunderstandings too.

What we could have talked about at WHO, however, was the increasingly common threat of incidents - even if they are termed "minor incidents" - at poorly maintained nuclear power plants, with the risk of accidental release of radioactive substances as happened at Chernobyl. At any rate, alerts have become frequent and we should take this as a warning. Just last week there was an alert. Nor did we talk at WHO about the difficulties of destroying nuclear weapons in the framework of disarmament agreements and the need to preserve the environment.

In the meantime, let's go back to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT, which, as my colleague reminded us a moment ago, is an indispensable instrument for international peace and security as well as for the social and economic well-being of peoples. Because it effectively bars the dissemination of nuclear weapons and provides a framework for general disarmament. Moreover, the NPT has verification machinery, thanks to the IAEA safeguards system, but still permits trade and international cooperation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

It is noteworthy, that, since the fourth Review Conference, in 1990, the number of States parties to the NPT has grown by 16 additional members and now includes all the nuclear-weapon States - at least, as they are defined in the Treaty itself. In all, 156 countries are parties to the NPT and there remain more than 30 States which have not yet acceded to it, even though some of them engage in nuclear activities. At any rate, South Africa, which was suspected of having a nuclear capability has admitted the fact and has joined the NPT. We hope that it will submit all its nuclear facilities to IAEA monitoring. At the very least, this is a positive development which creates favourable conditions

for the establishment in Africa of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. I call upon nuclear-weapon States to support Africans to that end.

However, in view of certain shortcomings and inadequacies, can we believe that IAEA has all the human, financial and technical resources necessary to assume its crucial role in the field of monitoring of nuclear facilities?

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

In other words, is IAEA properly equipped to discharge its international legal responsibilities as regards the application of safeguards at a time when significant discoveries are being made regarding the nuclear fuel cycle? The answer lies in the question. More precisely, we believe that an efficient, functional verification system is a fundamental requirement for the NPT. So all progress in the area of expertise and competence regarding verification will be of incalculable value for international non-proliferation efforts. In fine, no better service could be rendered to the worldwide credibility and authority of the NPT than to strengthen the verification machinery of the IAEA and execute the provisions of article VI of the Treaty properly. In addition, the NPT would benefit from genuine advances if things opened up as regards the total prohibition of nuclear tests, the provision of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and the banning of attacks against nuclear facilities. It is quite clear that the need to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban has become a crucial issue connected with the NPT and with nuclear disarmament in general. My delegation considers that it is because of all these factors that we must prepare for the forthcoming NPT Review Conference in 1995 in the certainty that the Treaty, which is indispensable in all respects, must remain in force indefinitely.

Therefore the nuclear-weapon States that have declared a moratorium on nuclear testing and those that have not yet done so should take the opportunity to commence negotiating a verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty. Our aim is to establish a system for controlling the proliferation not only of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, but also of long-range delivery vehicles and dual-capability technologies. In any event, verification measures should be balanced and equitable, and to be effective they should not impede the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes.

Naturally, Senegal, which attaches priority to the question of weapons of mass destruction, ascribes just as much importance to the control of conventional weapons. The distressing events occurring in various parts of the world, notably Africa, demonstrate in the clearest possible manner the consequences of unbridled and excessive accumulation of conventional weapons, how it aggravates local and regional conflicts. That is why, in his report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", (document A/C.1/47/7), the United Nations Secretary-General has underscored that transparency can be conducive to

confidence-building among States and eliminating risks of suspicion, misunderstanding, tension or threats of war. In that connection the Register of Conventional Weapons established by the United Nations in accordance with General Assembly resolution 46/36/L should help to create conditions of transparency and confidence, responsibility and stability for the strengthening of regional and international peace and security. Essentially the Register should institute an international code of conduct for the purposes of controlling arms transfers and the activities of weapons suppliers and dealers in accordance with universally applicable rules and standards. It is also a question of putting an end to the nefarious effects of the illicit

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arms trade connected with the vicious cycle of terrorism, drug trafficking and smuggling engaged in by irregular groups that are destabilizing modern societies.

It is to be hoped that, after four decades of the arms race, we are moving towards the demilitarization of economies, the conversion of military-industrial complexes to peaceful purposes. But the end of this process is not, of course, around the corner. Still waiting in the background are the many problems connected with the close relationship which my country has always held to exist between disarmament and development. The time has perhaps come to monitor arms deals, breaking the infernal cycle of illicit exports, and to diminish their impact on the world economy in order to achieve the better, transparent management of arsenals. I am convinced that the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency under the enlightened leadership of the Ambassador of Egypt, my friend, Mounir Zahran will be able to take account of all these factors, in a global approach to these very important aspects of disarmament.

Moreover, the report of the Secretary-General, in addressing the concepts of integration, globalization and revitalization, demonstrates clearly that disarmament and arms regulation are inseparable from political and economic questions, and that security itself has manifold dimensions that are political, economic, social, cultural and ecological. This situation becomes even more meaningful in this period of democratic transition and of economic recession and the spread of unemployment and poverty throughout the world. Likewise, peace is a global and indivisible concept, which means that progress achieved in disarmament for certain categories of armaments should be extended to others.

Incontrovertibly, the success in negotiating a chemical weapons convention shows that, after the cold war, the Conference on Disarmament has entered a new era that is full of promise and hope but also full of uncertainty and risk. Because the problems to be addressed are considerable and the challenges to be met are grave. To maintain its credibility the Conference will have henceforth to pay greater attention to the new threats to world peace and security. It must become involved in the prevention of armed conflicts exacerbated by extremes of nationalism and by identity crises, ethnic and religious tensions and territorial disputes. Hence, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of

conventional weapons will constitute a paramount concern of the international community in the years to come. In the final analysis, the global, long-term objective of the Conference, which is to reduce the levels of armaments and to inspire
confidence through legally binding disarmament agreements on the regional and world levels, will be decisive for the future.

It is an open secret that this objective will not be achieved overnight for this exciting enterprise, in which Senegal would like to be able to participate fully, requires the efforts and political will of all who comprise the international system. As the twentieth century draws to a close we must all endeavour to write a new page in the history of disarmament, of security and peace for the well-being of all humanity.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

Of course, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament must continue to be a multilateral negotiating body, not just a deliberative organ. The Conference must keep to its method of elaborating by consensus principles and rules of conduct applicable to the world disarmament processes, with the legal and political commitment of all States to respect them. Such an approach requires a forward-looking vision of the new realities, doctrines of deterrence, appropriate strategies reflecting the fact that the world has changed radically and is now multipolar and that enlargement of the Conference on Disarmament seems to us inevitable. My country, which made its application for admission in 1982, has always participated in the Conference's work as an observer, even though it has always been said that the question of expanding the membership requires an urgent decision. We should like to say that the Conference should be open to all States that wish to join it and have always given concrete evidence of their interest, their resolve and their commitment as regards disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Senegal for his statement and his kind remarks addressed to me and my country.

I now invite Ambassador Shannon, the Representative of Canada, to make a statement.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, I was honoured to have been, as Canada's Permanent Representative in Geneva, the President of the Conference on Disarmament from March 18 to May 18 of this year. Because I was in my capital last week for consultations I was unable to be present for the last meeting of the Canadian Presidency, but I am today able both to touch briefly on four sets of issues that have been before us in the Conference, and to extend my support to you, Ambassador Hou, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Canada and China have a long and fruitful history of cooperation in multilateral fora and I look forward to working closely with you during the second session.

I also wish to take this chance to thank the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui, and his very able staff for the highly professional support to me during my tenure as President. As well, I wish to join my Indonesian and Senegal colleagues in thanking Mr. Holst of Norway for his contribution to our debate. And finally, I wish to extend my congratulations to Ambassador Sene and other colleagues from Africa on this important anniversary of the founding of the Organization of African Unity.

The preceding two months have been a busy period for all of us and have included an active work programme by all ad hoc committees. Many CD delegations were present at the three week UNDC session in New York from April 19 to May 10 and at the NPT Extension Conference Preparatory Committee from May 10-May 14. The session now before us also promises to engage us in a focused way as we address the most pressing issue before us, i.e. the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

Before addressing the principal tasks before this body, I should note that the process of reform which we all seek, in the UNDC was clearly evident this year, as shown by the successful conclusion of the item on regional disarmament. The agreed report represents a global consensus that regional disarmament must be viewed in the context of international peace and security. This is starkly evident in the former Yugoslavia and in the Korean peninsula, where regional tensions can have a disruptive effect on global stability.

Equally impressive was the progress made on the item dealing with science and technology. It seems obvious to Canada from the debate on this issue that what is required is an approval on technology transfers that reflects the interests and views of both suppliers and recipients, and does so in a way that meets the twin objectives of enhancing international cooperation and promoting international security. In the Canadian view, adherence to internationally accepted non-proliferation norms is essential not only as a basis for international security but also for providing a basis for cooperation in the transfer of sensitive technology.

In my March 18 statement on assuming the presidency of the CD, I spoke of some issues of particular importance to Canada: the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the CD; the NPT, CD membership; and finally transparency in armaments. I would like to briefly take up these issues again.

Canada welcomed the commitment made by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Vancouver this year to negotiate a multilateral nuclear test ban at an early date. The place is the CD; and the time is now. Canada urges the United States of America, France and Russia to continue with moratoria on nuclear testing; and urges the United Kingdom and China to follow suit.

Nuclear testing in whatever form large or small, for safety or qualitative reasons - is in our view a vestige of a bygone era. The realization of a CTBT has long been a Canadian objective. We must seize this opportunity and summon the political will and energy to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

On verification, which is crucial to a meaningful CTBT, Canada is actively participating in the work of the group of scientific experts which is considering international cooperative efforts to detect and identify seismic events in support of a CTBT. On May 27, when the NTB ad hoc committee starts its second session's work, we will contribute a paper on non-seismic technologies which will outline two presentations Canada will be making to the Committee.

The GSE mandate has been criticized by some as being inflexible. Some say it does not allow for discussion on non-seismic technologies in support of a CTBT. However, presentation of the NTB ad hoc committee of papers on non-seismic technologies underscores the fact that other mechanisms for detection and verification can be examined under the aegis of the NTB ad hoc

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

committee. Ambassador Tanaka, the very able Chairman of the NTB ad hoc committee, can count on full Canadian participation in the work of his committee both at the technical and at the decision-making level.

On non-proliferation, the process of extending the NPT was begun auspiciously by the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Extension Conference in New York from May 10 to 14 and decisions were reached on such necessary procedural questions as the dates and venues of future meetings of the Preparatory Committee and of the Extension Conference itself; and on the establishment of what we regard as a very able Bureau.

As we move from process issues to substance, we will continue to need a spirit of cooperation that is based on a common appreciation of the significance and essentiality of the NPT to efforts not only to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also to contribute to their eventual complete elimination. On the latter point, Canada encourages all the nuclear Powers to make even deeper cuts in their nuclear arsenals - moves which, in addition to having their own intrinsic merit, would facilitate the attainment of our objectives with respect to non-proliferation.

Of course, we welcome the recent announcement by Belarus to ratify the NPT and we again call on Ukraine and Kazakhstan to sign the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States.

In May of last year, Canada's Prime Minister outlined a programme of action on non-proliferation for the consideration of the international community. That programme remains on the table. Stating that nothing is more important than the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the Prime Minister called on the world

community to strengthen the NPT when it comes up for extension in 1995. It is Canada's view that all countries should sign it, and that it must be extended indefinitely.

We believe that real progress is being made in terms of non-proliferation. As articulated by most countries, the basic premise of the NPT is a commitment by the nuclear Powers to reduce nuclear weapons in return for a commitment by the non-nuclear Powers not to acquire these weapons. The 1995 Extension Conference must confirm that process.

I would now like to turn to CD membership, a subject which has been touched on this morning and which will continue to occupy our time this session. A number of proposals for reform of CD membership have been considered during the preceding months, but many epitomize thinking more reflective of the cold-war era than of the world we face today. In our view to leave membership as it is at present, which some advocate, would be self-serving for some, and a signal to those not at the table that the CD is not prepared to recognize realities. To expand membership only slightly would signal disregard for the democratic principles of inclusion which we all cherish.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

On March 18, I set out Canada's preference for the option that would permit those countries which have formally requested to join the CD to be welcomed as full members immediately. This approach would, by our count, increase CD membership to a manageable number (between 69 and 75). Current CD membership obviously no longer reflects present geo-political realities. The changing world order is one based on democratic principles, and exclusivity is no longer acceptable. Canada also would have difficulties supporting the concept of the general United Nations family of nations being asked to continue to support financially a closed club here in Geneva.

In sum, Canada believes that the best choice among the options being addressed, would be to allow any country which formally applies by a certain date to be allowed to join the CD. I urge all current CD members to give this proposal their active consideration.

Finally, I would like to comment briefly on the work regarding transparency in armaments. The Register of Conventional Arms is now in place and Canada submitted its report by the April 30 deadline. This reflects our commitment to the Register. We would like to assume that either all CD members have submitted their voluntary data and background information to the Register, or, if they have not done so, that they plan to do so imminently.

You will recall that a group of governmental experts is due to convene in 1994 with a view to preparing for the Secretary-General at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly a report on the operation of the Register. Furthermore, this report will take into account the work of the CD as outlined in paragraphs 12 to 15 of resolution 46/36 L.

Time is marching on. If we are to meet our commitments, and make a useful contribution to the group of governmental experts, the ad hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments will need to accelerate its work.

I have touched briefly today on four key disarmament issues, the CTBT, the Non-proliferation Treaty, membership in this august body and transparency in armaments. Of course, the first two issues are of paramount importance. Unlike the NPT, however, where there is an established process in place which we hope will lead to its indefinite extension, we lack in the CD even a negotiating mandate for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

I wish to stress my Government's view that the time is ripe to act rapidly on the question of the negotiation of a CTBT. In the Canadian view, there is no better way to demonstrate the need for, and therefore the continuing relevance of the CD.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair as well as to my country.

(The President)

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I recognize the representative from the delegation of the DPRK. I wonder if you are going to make a statement on procedural matters or a statement of a substantive nature? I give the floor to the representative of the Mission of the DPRK.

Mr. CHONG (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): It is just a procedural matter.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative from the mission of the DPRK.

Mr. CHONG (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, first of all, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I did not intend to take the floor but since the Norwegian Minister mentioned our country concerning NPT, I reserve the right to take the floor at the next meeting, although the position of my Government on this issue is well known.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): Now, if there are no other delegations wishing to take the floor, I wish to turn to another subject. The secretariat has circulated today document CD/WP.443 containing a request from the Republic of Slovenia to participate in the work of the Conference in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure. I wish to note that we are taking action only in connection with the second paragraph of that communication, as the question of membership is being dealt now by the Special Coordinator appointed for that purpose. No objection has been raised in connection with the request of Slovenia to participate as a new member in our work: therefore, I take it that the request before you is acceptable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I shall inform the representative of Slovenia of the action taken by the Conference.

May I now turn to another matter. In accordance with the practice of the Conference and since there will be no plenary meeting on Thursday, I invite you to consider the timetable of the meetings to be held next week by the Conference, and its subsidiary bodies. As usual, the timetable has been prepared by the secretariat in consultation with the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies. Of course the timetable is only indicative and if necessary will be revised. On this understanding and if there is no objection, I will take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): Before adjourning the plenary meeting, I should like to record that we shall hold an informal open-ended consultation on the improved and effective function of the Conference immediately after the plenary meeting and in the same room, with interpretation services, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan.

That concludes our work for today. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 3 June 1993 at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.